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Keynes’ General Theory provides an interesting metaphor for asset markets: they are like 
newspaper competitions where contestants have to pick up the six prettiest faces from a 
hundred photographs, and the prize would go to one whose choice is closest to the average 
preferences. Keynes did not explicitly formalise the metaphor but his observations about the 
bond market and the speculative demand for money are closely related to this vision of asset 
markets.  
Our paper develops a class of decision rules from the suggestions in the General Theory and 
Keynes' QJE(1937) paper, and introduces a concept of ‘equilibrium guess’ which was not 
explicit in the newspaper competition idea. Using them we model a bond market which shows 
that the ‘newspaper competition’ amounts to endogenous determination of asset quality, and 
is capable of producing familiar Keynesian features: (i) demand for money develops infinite 
elasticity as interest rate approaches a low critical value; (ii) a shock to expected interest rate 
when the current rate is small, can lead to mass flight into money; and (iii) the more 
unanimous the market opinion, the more unstable the market, and the more difficult it is for 
monetary policy to be effective.  
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 Keynes’ Metaphor of the Newspaper Competition: A Model 
 
1. Introduction 
Keynes reasoned that because agents want to keep investments as liquid as possible, it is more 
important for them to follow the opinion of the market than study its fundamentals. The 
General Theory uses an interesting metaphor in this context: investment “.. may be likened to 
those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces 
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most 
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; … ” (Keynes, 
1973, p156).  
Guessing the market opinion, added to his observation that fundamentals themselves are not 
drawn from static probability distributions, has well-known implications for asset markets in 
Keynes’ theory. These implications are taken seriously in Keynesian traditions, where they 
constitute important elements of the environment of discourse. New Keynesians conclude that 
tracking of market opinion leads to less than ‘rational’ response to any change in 
fundamentals (Phelps, 1983). This observation is used not only as a critique of rational 
expectation but also as an assumption in asset market models, e.g. Pemberton(1988). A 
number of influential works have studied such muted response to fundamentals in various 
asset markets and used them for further theorisation, e.g. Mankiw and Summers (1984), Mors 
and Mayer (1985), Goodhart (1987). Keynes had a more detailed discussion of the theme in a 
subsequent article in QJE (Keynes, 1937). This discussion has inspired a number of important 
post-Keynesian formulations, e.g. Minsky(1982), Davidson (1991).  
Though its implications are regarded seriously, there has not been any attempt to model the 
newspaper competition metaphor explicitly. Our paper develops a simple model. We faced 
two difficulties in this task. The first is that the suggestions in the General Theory and the 
QJE paper are about what market expectations are based on; they do not provide any unique 
rule of expectation formation. So we first developed a set of restrictions on such rules implied 
by the features explicitly discussed in the General Theory and the QJE paper. This gave us a 
large class of rules, from which we chose the simplest member. 
The second difficulty is that, presented as a one-shot guessing exercise, the metaphor does not 
provide a concept of equilibrium guess. An equilibrium concept is not necessary for a 
metaphor intended to describe what market valuations are made of. But in an asset market 
model we have to provide agents with both a substance to anchor their opinions and a way to 
come to peace with their own opinions at some stage. To embed a notion of equilibrium guess 
into the proceedings, we propose a repetitive process of guessing the market until the process 
converges. An agent builds her assessment of risk of the asset by finding out how the market is currently treating it. This assessment leads to her decision to buy or not to buy, a decision 
that alters others’ assessment of the asset. The sequence of these disequilibrium trades 
terminates when all individuals’ assessments get consistent with overall market trade. The 
latter is the equilibrium trade at the given price. Given the initial expectations with which 
agents start, we can describe the demand for the asset as a function of its price. The metaphor 
is thus interpreted to suggest that (i) asset quality (riskiness in this context) is endogenously 
formed in a market economy, and (ii) the emergence of an equilibrium quality is a dynamic 
process and therefore subject to dynamic complications. 
In models of Keynesian lineage equilibria are affected by the state of long term expectations. 
The connection is usually shown by comparative statics. A shift in behavioural functions 
incorporating expectation alters the macroeconomic equilibrium. Though comparative static 
explanation is often suggested by Keynes’ writings, it is not the only possible suggestion. His 
discussion of instability from speculative demand (Keynes, 1973, p 172) hints at the market 
for money failing to reach an equilibrium following an expectation shock, rather than a shift 
in equilibrium. When the newspaper competition is embedded with a notion of equilibrium 
guess and asset demand is defined as we suggested above, demand acquires an implicitly 
dynamic content. It is defined only if the processes of guessing the market opinion and their 
feedbacks on demand converge. A change in expectation parameters can destabilise this 
dynamics and an asset market may be subject to instability on this account too. Our model 
demonstrates expectation-related instability both from comparative static shifts and dynamic 
failures.   
Though the newspaper competition metaphor was used to describe asset markets in general, 
the domain where Keynes followed it through to derive some analytical conclusions is the 
analysis of bond markets and the speculative demand for money (Chapter 13, General 
Theory). Conclusions from Chapter 13 famously include the possibility of the liquidity trap. 
This chapter also provides the interesting conclusion that while agents seek conformity with 
the average opinion, the stability of the system depends on the dispersion of opinions. To stay 
close to this discussion, we have developed our model in the context of a bond market. 
The specification of the model closely follows the Treatise (Keynes, 1971, chapter 15) 
because the same specification was carried through into the General Theory. Agents have a 
certain amount of zero-interest deposits which they use for buying bonds when opportune, so 
that the speculative demand for money is the complement of the demand for bonds. When in 
this environment we use an expectation formation rule based on the newspaper competition 
metaphor, the model produces several familiar Keynesian features. We show that the demand 
for money approaches infinite elasticity as the interest rate approaches a critical small value. 
Secondly, a turn to bearishness can land the economy in a liquidity trap due to a failure of 
dynamics. We also show “that the stability of the system and its sensitiveness to changes in the quantity of money” are “dependent on the existence of a variety of opinion about what is 
uncertain” (Keynes, 1973, p.172).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a class of rules of 
expectation formation from the features explicitly mentioned by Keynes. Using a simple rule 
from this class Section 3 develops the basic model of bond trading and the speculative 
demand for money. We show that very low expectations about future interest rate can produce 
certain badly behaved money demand functions. These functions are shown to create a 
number of problems in later sections. Section 4 presents the dynamic properties of the model. 
Section 5 shows that the demand for money tends to become infinitely elastic at low interest 
rates if interest rate expectation is low. Section 6 shows the possibility of a dynamic failure of 
the bond market after an expectation shock, leading to a mass flight into money holding. 
Finally section 7 explores the relation between the stability of the market and the unanimity or 
variety of opinion.   
 
2. Formation of Expectations  
The model environment is that of the Treatise. The focus is on the speculative component of 
the demand for money. Agents hold this money in non-earning savings deposits and use it to 
buy bonds if price and expected capital gain are attractive. There is only one type of bonds 
which promises to pay 1 unit of income per period and it carries no default risk. 




= . An agent buys 
a bond if the return plus expected capital gain is non-negative. Thus an agent who expects 
bond price to be p one period later, would buy a bond at price P if p-P+1 0.  ≥
To proceed further, we need a rule by which p is determined. The rule should take into 
account the features that explicitly appeared in Keynes’ discussion. Those features however 
do not define a unique rule but a class of rules.  We will first characterise the class and then 
choose one from it that has straightforward intuitive meaning and is simple to handle 
analytically.  
While the General Theory provides the philosophy of expectation formation, the details 
appear in the QJE paper and the Treatise. Two explicit statements from the QJE paper restrict 
the class of rules significantly:  
(i) “Knowing that our own individual judgement is worthless, we endeavour to fall back on 
the judgement of the rest of the world, which is perhaps better informed.” (Keynes, 1937) 
(ii) ‘We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of 
existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, so that we can accept it 
as such unless and until something new and relevant comes into the picture.” (Keynes, 1937)  The so-called ‘individual judgements’ in (i) are the priors which agents do not have much 
faith in, and would like to update using “the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices 
and the character of existing output” suggested in (ii). Let q denote the prior ‘individual 
judgement’ of an agent about the future price of bonds and X a market variable that agents 
trust as “a correct summing up of future prospects”. A general characterisation of p is then 
given by pt = f(q, Xt-1), f1 >0, where t is a subscript denoting periods. Further, if X is a variable 
that moves up with “future prospects”, then f2 > 0.  
To characterise the distribution of q over agents, note that it is necessary that it is not identical 
for all agents. The newspaper competition is trivial if q is identical. In an asset market, if q is 
identical then market demand or price does not provide any additional information
1. 
Accordingly we assume that q is distributed in{ } , qq where  q andq are both positive. For 
analytical convenience we will assume that agents arranged in the ascending order of q form a 
unit mass in { } , qq with uniform density δ. An agent with prior q will be referred to as agent 
q. 
 
A further restriction on f(q, Xt-1) arises from the Treatise. Discussing the sequence of events 
when security price is rising, Keynes observes that not all agents are equally influenced by the 
prevailing opinion. To quote, “… in proportion as the prevailing opinion comes to seem 
unreasonable to more cautious people, the ‘other view’ will tend to develop, with the result of 
an increase in the ‘bear’ position…” . Thus more cautious agents (smaller q) are less 
impressed by movements in X than others. This feature of expectation is vital for explaining 
the development of the ‘other view’ or a turn in the market, and we add f12 = f21 > 0 to the list 
of restrictions. 
Together these restrictions yield a class of rules S ={pt | pt = f(q, Xt-1), f1>0, f2>0, f12>0}. We 
will use a simple rule from this class:  
1 (1 ), 0 tt pq X α α − =+ >  ( 1 )    
Clearly rule (1) belongs to S. It implies a process of revision of q based on X, where the 
amount of revision is smaller for ‘more cautious people’.  
Finally for Xt we will use the value of bond trade in period t, denoted by Vt. Hence the 
expectation rule (1) is written as 
1 (1 ), 0 tt pq V α α − =+ >        ( 2 )    
                                                      
1 Given his view that there is no objective knowledge of the future, Keynes took a non-zero variance of 
q for granted. We perhaps need to add a further assumption that there is no compulsion or convention 
that forces everyone to have or behave as if they have the same prior.   3. Bond trading and the speculative demand for money  
We assume that all agents have equal amount of endowment
2 normalised to 1 so that 
endowments held by all agents together is ( qq ) δ − . Since the mass of agents is 1 by 
construction, total endowments ( qq ) δ − =1.   
Let M be the demand for time deposits. Since agents either buy bonds with their money or 
hold it as savings deposit, we have 
1 M V =−           ( 3 )  
When the price of bonds is P an agent spends all her money on bonds if  
1 11 tt pPq q V P0 α − +−= + + − ≥     (4)     
Otherwise the agent keeps all her money in deposits. Let qlt denote the lowest q for which (4) 
holds, i.e.  1 1 lt lt t qq V P 0 α − ++ − = . Then only those agents whose priors are qlt or higher will 
buy bonds, and total value of bond trade, Vt, is () lt qq δ − . 
This trade need not be the equilibrium trade at price P. To define equilibrium trade, consider a 
sequence of periods starting when P is announced. Equilibrium trade is attained only when a 
period is reached in which there is no further updating of expectations so that trade does not 
change in the absence of price change or expectation shocks. 
Definition: Equilibrium bond trade at price P is V(P) =  ( qq ) δ − , where 
() 1 qq q q P 0 α δ +− + − =                   (5)                                                 
Rewriting (5) in terms of V, and writing ρ for 1/δ, we get the trade function  
2 () 1 PV V q αρ α ρ =− + − + +q                                  (6) 
Remark 1: The trade function would shift if there is a change inq , which is the prior of 




= , and note that it is the lowest 
expectation about interest rate.  Hence the trade function shifts if there is a change in the most 
pessimistic interest expectation of the market. Since M = 1 –V, these remarks apply to the 
speculative demand for money as well. 
 
The value of q  not only shifts the trade and money demand functions, but also has a bearing 
on the shape of the functions. We state this in the following proposition. 
                                                      
2 The more realistic assumption that agents have different endowments does not change the qualitative 
results, but makes the mathematics cumbersome.   Proposition 1: Let a demand function for money
3 be called ‘well behaved’ if
dM
dr
<0 for all r 
in the domain of r and ‘badly behaved’ otherwise. Then, forq
ρ
α
≤  the demand function is 
well behaved and it is badly behaved otherwise.  
 
From (6) we have 
V =
21 1
[( ) {( ) 4 ( 1)} ]
2
qq P q αρ αρ α ρ
αρ
−± − − − −
/ 2               (7) 









1 P ≤ ≤+ ≡ . However there is a smallest 
P>0, call itP , at which all endowments are converted to bonds, i.e.  V = 1 at P =P .  It 
follows from (6) that 1 ( 1) ( ) 1 ( 1) Pq q α ρ =+ + − =+ + α >0. Hence the domain of P for our 
discussion is{,} PP.  
•  If q
ρ
α
≤ , then from (7) V has only one positive solution in{ } ,1 Pq P +< , namely 
2 1
[( ) {( ) 4 ( 1)} ]
2
qq P q αρ αρ α ρ
αρ
−+ − − − −
1 / 2         (8) 
It follows that {






=− − − − − } <0 everywhere. The graph of 




1 dM dM dV
P
dr r dP dP
=− = . Hence 
dM
dr
 <0 everywhere, and the demand for 




> ,  real and positive solutions exist for all P in { } , PP  with two distinct 
properties in two parts of the domain. For,  1 PP q ≤ ≤+  there is a single positive 
solution V. For these solutions, {}






=− − − − − <0.  
But for 1 qP +< < P , there is a pair of distinct positive solutions as given by(7). Thus 
for  P  in 1 qP +< < P
                                                     
,V(P) has two branches with positive and negative slopes 
 
3 We will avoid the adjective ‘speculative’ if it does not create any confusion.  respectively. At P  the two branches merge and 0
dV
dP
= .  The graph of V(P) is shown 
in figure 1b.  
Correspondingly on the demand function for money, 
dM
dr
<0 for  1 PP q ≤≤ +. But 
for 1 qP +< < P  it has two branches with a positive and a negative slope.  Hence 




Remark 2: Define a critical interest rate c r
α
ρ




= introduced earlier, 
the demand function for money is well behaved if c rr ≥ and is badly behaved if c rr < . 
 
 
1 +q  
V=1 
Figure 1a:  q
ρ
α























4. Dynamics of demand  
We need to examine how, if at all, the equilibrium trade defined in (5)is attained for a given 
P. The lowest prior for bond purchasers, qlt, is given by 
1 1 lt lt t qq V P 0 α − ++ − =         ( 9 )  
Using  ( t Vq q ) l t δ =− we rewrite(9) in terms of V 
11 (1 ) 1 0 tt t VV q V P ρ αα −− +− + − =          ( 1 0 )  
In equilibrium, Vt = Vt-1 = V, and (10) gives
2 () 1 PV V q αρ α ρ q = −+− + + , which is the 
same as equation (6).  Case 1: q
ρ
α
≤ or c rr ≥ . Equation (6) has a unique positive solution everywhere between P  


























> . It follows that (10) is 
necessarily stable if the demand for money is ‘well behaved’.  






. Convergence of 
V ensures the convergence of M. A change in r in its domain leads M to its new equilibrium 
value.  
 
Case 2:  q
ρ
α
> or c rr < . There are two sub-domains with different properties. If P < 1+q , 
equation (6) has one solution, and equation (10) converges to this solution as in Case 1. 






































<1, implying that only the negatively sloped branch is stable.  The 
















≤ i.e.  c rr ≥ , demand for money is well-behaved in the sense that after a shock in 
interest rate or bond price, demand converges to a new equilibrium.    
Vt-1 Vt-1






Figure 2a: P < 1+q , 
Figure 2b: P > 1+q , Ifq
ρ
α
>  i.e.  c rr <  the downward sloping branch V2(P) to the right of P in figure 1b is 
stable and represents the market trade in bonds. When P changes, trade moves along this 
branch. Correspondingly, as r changes the demand for money moves to a new equilibrium 
demand along a negatively sloped demand curve. Ordinarily, the unstable branch plays little 
role because the market can not stabilise on any point on the unstable branch.  
However when P is close toP  the unstable branch can create two types of difficulties for 
bond trading and the demand for money. They are discussed in the following two sections. 
 
5. Interest Elasticity of Money and the Liquidity Trap 
The first of these problems is that the badly behaved demand function tends to approach 
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=− + − − − −
/ 2 , so that  
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= + , asPP → , 
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=→ − ∞ as r approachesR  from above. These observations are summarised in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: There is a critical interest rateR >0 such that the elasticity of demand for 
speculative deposits approaches infinity as interest rate approachesR . 
 
Proposition 2 illustrates Keynes’ observation that “…circumstances can develop in which 
even a large increase in the quantity of money may exert a comparatively small influence on 
the rate of interest.” (Keynes, 1973, p 172). Textbooks typically illustrate this with a 
horizontal segment on the LM curve. If an equilibrium happens to be on this segment then an 
increase in money supply fails to shift the IS-LM equilibrium.  
 
6. Expectation Shock and the Liquidity Trap 
The possibility of a liquidity trap is usually attributed to the demand for money developing 
very large elasticity at low interest rates. In that sense Proposition 2 suggests a liquidity trap. However a liquidity trap may also arise from unstable dynamics. The demand for money may 
tend to increase indefinitely failing to converge to an equilibrium value after an expectation 
shock.  
The situation can arise if there is a positive shock to q  when P is close toP  on a badly 
behaved trade function. Letq
ρ
α
> , so that the trade function is badly behaved. Figure 3 
shows a typical curve labelled as curve V. Consider a point (V(P), P) on the stable part of the 
curve where price is close toP  and () () VP VP = +∆, ∆ a small positive quantity.  Now 
imagine that q  goes up fromq toq ε + , ε >0 following an expectation shock. The shock will 
result in a new trade function.  




+ > , so the 









= + , so the new function will 





. Hence 11 () () VP VP > . 
The new function is labelled as curveV1 in the diagram.  
 
Starting from the existing trade , the market now has to establish a new equilibrium 
amount of trade on curve 2 at the existing price P. Suppose ε is large enough so 
that
() VP
11 () () VP VP > . In that case starting from the existing value of trade the market can not 
converge to the stable equilibrium solution on the new function. In the diagram, the existing 
value of trade on the new function is at B and the stable equilibrium at price P is at A. Starting 
from B, trade would begin falling and approach zero.  
A sufficient condition for this is  
11 () () VP VP >   




qq α ερ α ρ
αρ αρ
+− −
>+ ∆ , which simplifies to  2 ε ρ >∆ .  
Clearly, for any given ∆ >0, there is a corresponding ε >0 that satisfies this condition.  
 









we can state the following proposition. Proposition 3: When the interest rate isR η + ,  η  a small positive quantity, there exists 
µ(η )> 0 such that a fall in expectation  r  to  r µ − leads to increase in the demand for money 
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Figure 3  
 
 
7. Stability and the Variety of Opinion 
In a number of places Keynes commented that if market opinion is too unanimous, it leads to 
instability. Discussing the conditions for successful conduct of monetary policy he makes the 
following observation in the General Theory: “ …opinion about the future of the rate of 
interest may be so unanimous that a small change in present rates may cause a mass 
movement into cash. It is interesting that the stability of the system and its sensitiveness to 
changes in the quantity of money should be so dependent on the existence of a variety of 
opinion about what is uncertain. Best of all that we should know the future. But if not, then, if 
we are to control the activity of the economic system by changing the quantity of money, it is 
important that opinions should differ.”(Keynes, 1973, p 172).  
This observation is true for the model developed here. Though agents have a given set of 
priors with a fixed distribution in{ } , qq , the posterior expectations with which they decide to 
buy or abstain, change with price and are endogenously determined. At any price P, 
let () p P and () pP denote the lowest and the highest posterior expectations, given(,) qq. Define variety of opinion at price P as v(P) = pp − . Then v(P) = () { 1( qq V P ) } α − + . Note 
that v <0 and v approaches its minimum as ′ PP → . Hence proposition (2) can be restated as: 
Proposition  :  The elasticity of demand for speculative deposits approaches infinity as 
variety of opinion in the market approaches its minimum. 
2′
 
The significance of variety in the context of dynamics can be appreciated using the discussion 
of section 6. We had noted there that when () VV P = +∆,  ∆ >0, an expectation shock 
2 ε ρ >∆  is sufficient to induce a mass flight to money. At () VV P = +∆, let P =P σ + , 
σ<0. For given(,) qq denote the minimum value of v by v*, so that v* =  () vP. Then 
( vP ) σ + -v* = () { ( ) ( ) } () q qVP VP q q ασ α − +− = − ∆ .  
Hence as () vP σ + →v*,  and ε 0. The closer is the variety of opinion to v*, the 
smaller is the expectation shock necessary to induce a mass flight to money.  
0 ∆→ →
 8. Conclusion 
The model developed here is one possible rendering and does not claim exegetic authenticity. 
We wanted to explore the effects of a decision making process based on others’ decisions that 
was emphasised in Keynes’ writings. Does that alter the working of asset markets 
dramatically?  We conclude that such processes introduce a source of instability. Exogenous 
shifts in expectation parameters contribute to the volatility of economic variables. But implied 
in Keynes’ writings and much of Post Keynesian formulations is an idea of instability rather 
than volatility. Instability is a dynamic problem, and this model shows that expectation 
formation relying on the decision of others introduces dynamic complications. REFERENCES 
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